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THE POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TO
PROTECT THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY*
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAUt
REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE USE OF STREETS AND SIDEWALKS
Municipal regulation of streets and sidewalks is regularly
authorized under state law. It must, however, survive in its
particular manifestations and applications state constitutional
provisions,' as well as the United States Constitution, particu-
larly the latter's due process, 2 equal protection,3 and commerce'
clauses. There is the possibility, too, that state statutes may
confer upon state commissions exclusive or paramount authority
over certain particulars. 5 So, too, states may withdraw these
powers from cities and confer them upon other bodies., Many
forms of conflict with state authority occur in this field. 7
Subject to these above limitations, municipalities can control
the speed of vehicles on their streets,8 establish stop intersec-
tions,9 create safety zones,1 0 order the removal of obstructions,"
and prohibit the erection of billboards likely to obstruct the
* A chapter in a forthcoming text on the law of municipal corporations.
Other chapters appear in current issues of the Temple Law Quarterly,
Missouri Law Review, and the Rocky Mountain Law Review.
' Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law.
1. Western Auto Transport v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 120 P.2d
590 (1942); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312, 49
N.E.2d 153 (1943); Goldstein v. City of Hamtramck, 227 Mich. 263,
198 N.W. 962 (1924). Delegation of power to administrative officials
without adequate guides will invalidate traffic ordinances. Compare:
City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 (1925); City
of Chicago v. Mariotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N.E. 369 (1928) ; City of Cleveland
v. Gustafson, 24 Ohio St. 607, 180 N.E. 59 (1932).
2. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
3. Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
4. Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928).
5. Notes, 20 M.S.B.J. 216 (1941), 1 VAND. L. Rzv. 464 (1948).
6. In re Delaware River Joint Commn., 342 Pa. 119, 19 A.2d 278 (1941).
7. Harshaw v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 154 Kan. 481, 119 P.2d
459 (1941); Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942);
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
8. Winters v. Bisaillon, 152 Ore. 578, 54 P.2d 1169 (1936). At least in
the absence of conflict with state law. Harshaw v. Kansas City Public
Service Co., 154 Kan. 481, 119 P.2d 459 (1941).
9. Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942); City of
Chicago v. Marriotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N.E. 369 (1928).
10. City of Cleveland v. Gustafson, 124 Ohio St. 607, 180 N.E. 59 (1932).
11. Shuck v. Borough of Ligonier, 343 Pa. 265, 22 A.2d 735 (1941).
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vision of, or constitute unreasonable distraction to, drivers. 2
Municipal corporations can inspect vehicles using their streets, 3
and often license them.14 Although cities have sometimes been
sustained in completely excluding from the streets certain kinds
of vehicles,15 courts are often unwilling to sustain complete
bans, by prohibitive licensing or otherwise, upon vehicles useful
in trade and commerce. 16
Ordinances prescribing time limits on parking are valid, 7 and
parking in certain locations may be completely prohibited." Cars
parked in violation of ordinances may be impounded by munici-
pal authorities,", and the payment of pound fees thereupon de-
12. Churchhill & Tait v. Rafferty, 32 P.I. 580 (1918), app. dism. 248 U.S.
591; Kelbro v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943); General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E.
799 (1935); Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932);
Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. City of New York, 194 N.Y. 19, 86 N.E. 824
(1909); Stringham v. Salt Lake City, 201 P.2d 758 (Utah 1949); Hay-a-
tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So.2d 433 (1942); Wilson,
Billhoard.: and the Right to be Seen froin the Highway, 30 GEo. L. REV.
723, 743 (1941) ; Proffitt, Public Aesthetics and the Billboard, 16 CORNELL
L.Q. 151 (1931); Notes, 29 MICH. L. Rnv. 381 (1930), 36 MICH. L. RaV.
667 (1937).
13. And reasonable inspection fees will be upheld. Mayer v. Ames, 133
Ohio St. 458, 14 N.E.2d 617 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 621, noted in
7 GEo. WASH. L. Ruv. 262 (1938); City of Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198,
4 N.E.2d 78 (1936). Contra: Davenport v. Blackmur, 186 So. 321 (Miss.
1939).
14. And the license fees can generally be sufficient to cover costs of
construction, maintenance and policing. Firestone v. City of Cambridge,
113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (1925). See also cases cited infra in notes
26, 33 and 34.
15. Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516 (1917) (jitneys);
Red Star Motor Drivers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 244 Mich. 480, 221 N.W.
622 (1928), noted in 27 MICH. L. REv. 528 (1929) (jitneys) ; City of Canton
v. Van Voorhis, 61 Ohio App. 419, 22 N.E.2d 651 (1939) (private garbage
carriers), noted in 38 MICH. L. REV. 1334 (1940); Commonwealth v. Dun-
ham, 191 Pa. 73, 43 Atl. 34 (1899) (peddlers).
16. Gurland v. Town of Kearney, 128 N.J.L. 22, 24 A.2d 210 (1942)
(ice cream vendors); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y.
,12, 49 N.E.2d 153 (1943) (same); Bogue v. Bennett, 156 Ind. 478, 60
N.E. 143 (1901) (traction engines.)
17. People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E.2d 501 (1940); People v.
Garland, 193 N.Y. Misc. 664 (N.Y. Mag. Ct. 1948); Chicago v. McKinley,
344 I1. 297, 176 N.E. 261 (1931); State v. Sweeney, 90 N.H. 127, 5 A.2d
41 (1939).
18. Thompson v. City of Reidsville, 203 N.C. 502, 166 S.E. 389 (1932);
England v. Twp. Committee of Milburn, 122 N.J.L. 462, 5 A.2d 782
(1939); Hoynen v. Wurstner, 63 N.E.2d 229 (Ohio 1945); see notes,
72 A.L.R. 229 (1931), 108 A.L.R. 1152 (1937), 130 A.L.R. 316 (1941).
Bw see Haggenjos v. City of Chicago, 336 Ill. 573, 168 N.E. 661 (1929).
19. McLaurine v. City of Birmingham, 247 Ala. 414, 24 So.2d 755(1946); Hughes v. City of Pheonix, 64 Ariz. 331, 170 P.2d 297 (1946).
See note, 163 A.L.R. 926 (1946).
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manded.20 Municipalities are regularly upheld in installing park-
ing meters,21 and even in purchasing and maintaining off-the-
street parking facilities. 22 Theoretically, parking meters installed
under a regulatory police power cannot produce revenue grossly
or regularly in excess of expenses, but it is the rare case that
has invalidated a parking meter ordinance therefor.23
It is generally said that there is no right to use city streets
for purpose of private gain24 and such use can be subjected to
extensive municipal regulation and, at times, even prohibition.
So it has been held that municipalities can completely ban from
the streets jitneys or cabs, 20 and licensing of such vehicles is
everywhere sustained . 2  Cities are also upheld in limiting the
number of cabs,27 and in regulating their solicitation practices,2
stands and parking,2 9 load limits, 30 indemnity insurance cover-
age,2 1 and fares.22
20. Steiner v. City of New Orleans, 173 La. 275, 136 So. 596 (1931).
And note City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N.E.2d 802(1943); upholding an ordinance making a prima facie case against an
owner whose car was parked at a fire hydrant.
21. Wm. Laubach & Sons v. City of Easton, 347 Pa. 542, 32 A.2d 881
(1943); Grimes, The Legality of Parking Meter Ordinances and the Per-
missible Use of Parking Meter Funds, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1946). Notes,
29 VA. L. R-3. 617 (1943), 18 IND. L.J. 324 (1935), 37 Ky. L.J. 91 (1948),
see Notes, 108 A.L.R. 1142 (1937), 130 A.L.R. 316 (1941). Parking
meters can be purchased under conditional sales contracts according to
Sherman v. City of Picker, 204 P.2d 535 (Okla. 1949). The delegation
of authority to an official to determine location will not invalidate parking
meter ordinances. State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So.
314 (1936).
22. Miller v. City of Georgetown, 301 Ky. 241 191 S W.2d 403 (1945);
City of Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal.2d 664, 151 5P.2d 5 (1944). Compare
City of Cleveland v. Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).
23. Brodkey v. Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1291, 291 N.W. 171 (1940); City
of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114(1937), overruled in City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So.2d
673 (1948).
24. McCraney v. City of Leeds, 241 Ala. 198, 1 So.2d 894 (1941).
25. People's Taxicab Co. v. City of Wichita, 140 Kan. 129, 34 P.2d 545
(1934), and cases cited therein; City of New Orleans v. Badie. 146 La.
550, 83 So. 826 (1920). Contra: Jitney Bus Assn. v. Wilkes-Barre, 256 Pa.
462, 100 Atl. 954 (1917).
26. Desser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820, 153 Pac. 1194 (1916);
Wichita v. Home Cab Co., 141 Kan. 697, 42 P.2d 972 (1935); Morley v.
Wilson, 261 Mass. 269, 159 N.E. 41 (1927); G. I. Veterans' Cab Assn. v.
Yellow Cab Co., 65 A.2d 173 (Md. 1949).
27. Desser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820, 153 Pac. 1194 (1916).
28. Lowe v. City Council of Augusta, 45 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Ga. 1942),
a ffd. as Derrick v. City Council of Augusta, 138 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 777 (1944).
29. City of New Orleans v. Calamari, 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172 (1922);
Sullivan v. Police Commrs. of Boston, 304 Mass. 113, 23 N.E.2d 106 (1939).
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Busses operating solely within the city can be licensed, 33 and
there is even authority for municipal licensing of inter-urban
and interstate busses.3 4  Regulation as to routes,35 stops,"6
and indemnity insurance coverage37 will almost certainly
be sustained if reasonable and not in conflict with state
authority.38 Rather frequently occupation of the field by the
state prevents municipal regulation in this matter.3 9 If the
busses operate interstate, unreasonable license fees will be
invalidated under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution." Similarly, state constitutions are frequently
deemed violated in the case of inter-urban busses by fees unrea-
sonable in amount or discriminatory against out-of-town lines.41-
Hawkers and peddlers using the city streets are subject to
licensing and regulation.4- However, here as elsewhere, local
Exclusive stands can be granted. McFall v. St. Louis, 232 Mo. 716, 135
S.W. 51 (1911). See Note, 33 L.R.A.(n.s.) 471 (1911).
30. Lowe v. City Council of Augusta, 45 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Ga. 1942).
31. Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516 (1917) ; Melconian v.
City of Grand Rapids, 218 Mich. 397, 188 N.W. 521 (1922). See Note, 95
A.L.R. 1224 (1935).
32. Parsons v. City of Galveston, 53 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1932); Clem v.
City of LaGrange, 169 Ga. 51, 149 S.E. 638 (1929).
33. State v. Palmer, 212 Minn. 388, 3 N.W.2d 666 (1942).
:,4. Star Transportation Co. v. Mason City, 195 Iowa 930, 192 N.W. 873
(1923); Sylvania Busses v. City of Toledo, 118 Ohio St. 187, 160 N.E. 674
(1928); State v. Palmer, supra note 33. Cf. McDonald v. Paragould, 120
Ark. 226, 179 S.W. 335 (1915).
35. Murphy v. City of Toledo, 108 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 626 (1923);
Star Highway Motorbus Co. v. City of Lansing, 238 Mich. 146, 213 N.W.
79 (1927).
:36. Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595
(1923); Star Highway Motorbus Co. v. City of Lansing, 238 Mich. 146,
213 N.W. 79 (1927).
37. Star Highway Motorbus Co. v. City of Lansing, 238 Mich. 146, 213
N.W. 79 (1927).
38. Clem v. City of La Grange, 169 Ga. 51, 149 S.E. 638 (1929) holding
reasonable and valid many bus regulations; Pennjersey Rapid Transit Co.
v. City of Camden, 6 N.J. Misc. 813, 142 Atl. 821 (Sup. Ct. 1928) holding
unreasonable a prohibition upon double-deck busses.
39. Nelsonville v. Ramsey, 113 Ohio St. 217, 148 N.E. 694 (1925);
Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22
(1929). See Note, 66 A.L.R. 847 (1930).
40. Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948). See Notes,
56 A.L.R. 1056 (1928), 81 A.L.R. 415 (1932), 87 A.L.R. 735 (1933).
41. McDonald v. Paragould, 120 Ark. 226, 179 S.W. 335 (1915) ; City of
Lincoln v. Dehner, 268 Ill. 175, 108 N.E. 991 (1915).
42. Kansas City v. Overton, 68 Kan. 560, 75 Pac. 549 (1904); Dooley v.
City of Cleveland, 175 Tenn. 439, 135 S.W.2d 649 (1940); City of Chicago
v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N.E.2d 905 (1936). Notes, 2 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 440
(1949), 28 NEB. L. REv. 289 (1949).
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ordinances are invalidated because of unreasonable fees43 or
discrimination against non-residents.44
Trucks operating in or passing through cities can be regulated
by municipalities in many ways.45 Although the United States
Supreme Court has sustained New York's City's ordinance ban-
ning advertising on the sides of trucks not owned by the ad-
-vertiser, 4 a similar Chicago ordinance has been annulled under
the state constitution by the Illinois Court.47 The Commerce
Clause results in the invaliadtion of unreasonable license fees
upon interstate truckers,"1 but the courts are not agreed on
whether inter-city trucks can be required to seek municipal
licenses or franchises.49 Nor are they agreed on whether munici-
palities can require licenses and fees of out-of-town firms de-
livering in the city, when the ordinances do not apply to local
distributors."
Subject to earlier mentioned limitations, municipalities have
been able to regulate railroads passing through the community
as to such things as speed5' and safety precautions at crossings.52
Oftentimes municipal power over streets extends to licensing
43. Iowa City v. Glassman, 155 Iowa 671, 136 N.W. 899 (1912).
44. Goldstein v. City of Hamtramck, 227 Mich. 263, 198 N.W. 962
(1924).
45. Ferguson Coal Co. v. Thompson, 343 Ill. 20, 174 N.E. 896 (1931);
Kenosha Auto Transport v. Cheyenne, 55 Wyo. 298, 100 P.2d 109 (1940);
Wilbur v. City of Newton, 301 Mass. 97, 16 N.E.2d 86 (1938). Compare
Sumner County v. Interurban Transportation Co., 141 Tenn. 493, 213 S.W.
412 (1919). And note People v. Marcello, 25 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. Mar. Ct.
1941) to the effect that a village may not prohibit trucks from using a
state highway through the village.
46. Railway Express v. City of New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), noted
in 24 (N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 620 (1949).
47. Chicago Park District v. Canfield, 382 Ill. 218, 47 N.E.2d 61 (1943).
48. Ingels v. Morf, 300 U. S. 290 (1937), noted in 23 VA. L. Rnv. 842
(1937). For fee held reasonable see People v. Madden, 9 N.Y.S.2d 64, 169
Misc. 745 (N.Y. Mag. Ct. 1939).
49. Dent v. Oregon City, 106 Ore. 122, 211 Pac. 909 (1923) (denying
power of municipality to require franchise); Western Auto Transport v.
City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 120 P.2d 590 (1942) (denying power to
require license, and collecting cases both ways); People v. Marcello, 25
N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y., Mag. Ct. 1941) (denying power).
50. General Baking Co. v. City of Belleville, 384 Ill. 459, 51 N.E.2d 546(1943) (upholding where local bakeries inspected under other ordinances) ;
Sanford v. City of Clanton, 31 Ala. App. 53, 15 So.2d 303 (1943) (up-
holding); Linen Service Corp. of Texas v. City of Abilene, 169 S.W.2d 497
(Tex. 1943) (denying).
51. Erb. v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584 (1900); Nashville Ry. v. White, 278
U.S. 456 (1929).
52. State v. Jersey City, 29 N.J.L. (5 Dutch) 170 (1861); Buffalo &
Niagara Falls Rr. Co. v. Buffalo, 5 Hill 209 (1843); Great Western Rr.
Co. v. Decatur, 33 Ill. 381 (1864).
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and regulating street railways, light, telephone and water utili-
ties using the streets, 3 and even to setting rates.54 However,
such power is often vested in state commissions. 5
Cities can require permits for parades and processions in the
streets, even as to those claiming dispensation because of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.6 Munici-
palities can punish those who use sound trucks in a loud and
raucous manner.57 Those who interfere with street traffic by
speech, assembly or the distribution of literature, are constitu-
tionally subject to municipal control.53
Courts generally acknowledge a common law right of ingress
and egress in owners whose property abuts city streets.59 This
usually permits the construction of a driveway so long as it
does not materially interfere with the use of the walk by pedes-
trians or create a traffic hazard °0 Nevertheless, cities have
often been sustained in prohibiting such owners from cutting
curbs into streets and across boulevards,61 and it is frequently
53. Village of Jonesville v. Telephone Co., 155 Mich. 86 (1908); City of
Wilson v. Weber, 101 Kan. 425, 166 Pac. 512 (1917); Michigan Telephone
Co. v. City of St. Joseph, 121 Mich. 502 (1899); Omaha and Council Bluffs
St. Ry. v. City of Omaha, 114 Neb. 483, 208 N.W. 123 (1926); State v.
Gish, 168 Iowa 70, 150 N.W. 37 (1917); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. City
of Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 291, 152 Atl. 23 (1930); Village of Heyworth v.
Central Illinois Elec. & Gas Co., 378 Ill. 506, 39 N.E.2d 26 (1942), cert.
denied, 316 U. S. 670; City of New Rochelle v. Burke, 43 N.E.2d 463, 288
N.Y. 906 (1942). On the power to oust upon expiration of the franchise,
see note, 30 ILL B.J. 254 (1942).
54. City of Kalamazoo v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 200 Mich. 146, 166
N.W. 998 (1918).
55. Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E.
22 (1929); North Star Line v. City of Grand Rapids, 259 Mich. 654, 244
N.W. 192 (1932).
56. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), noted in 21 B.U.L. REV.
540 (1941). So, too, for the use of parkways. People v. Hass, 299 N.Y. 681,
87 N.E.2d 68, app. dism. per curian, 338 U.S. 803 (1949).
57. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), noted in 47 MiCH. L. REv.
1007 (1949). Compare Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), noted in
47 MicH. L. REV. 111 (1948) invalidating a prior restraint upon sound
trucks.
58. Jones v. City of Moultrie, 196 Ga. 526, 27 S.E.2d 39 (1943);
Stephens v. Stickel, 146 Fla. 104, 200 So. 396 (1941); Hannan v. City of
Haverhill, 120 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 641 (1941).
59. Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167, 28 S.E.2d 135 (1944);
City of Norman v. Safeway Stores, 193 Okla. 534, 145 P.2d 765 (1944);
McGowan v. City of Burns, 172 Ore. 63, 137 P.2d 994 (1943); Bacich v.
Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1944); Owens v. Owens,
193 S.C. 260, 8 S.E.2d 339 (1940). Note, 41 YALE L.J. 221 (1931).
60. See cases cited in note 59.
61. State ex rel. Copland v. City of Toledo, 75 Ohio App. 378, 62 N.E.2d
256 (1945); Breinig v. Allegheny County, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1939);
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said that an abutting owner's rights are subordinate to any
reasonable municipal regulation necessary to facilitate general
travel.6 2 Courts similarly recognize an abutting owner's right
of view,6 3 but this will not prevent municipal regulation of ad-
vertising on the owner's building, at least of products not sold
therein.6' Although temporary obstructions necessary to build-
ing construction have been condoned, " courts will deny abutting
owners any right to unreasonably clutter sidewalks or obstruct
streets in front of their premises. 6 Municipal regulations of
signs hanging over the walk or street have been upheld, 7 as have
limitations upon awnings68 and sidewalk obstructions. 0 A ban
upon the projection of voices irritating to pedestrians has also
been upheld.70 Courts are not agreed as to the validity of munici-
pal ordinances imposing upon abutting owners the cost of
sprinkling the streets 7 1 nor do they always uphold ordinances
casting upon abutting owners the obligation of clearing snow
and ice from sidewalks.72
Collier v. City of Memphis, 180 Tenn. 509, 176 S.W.2d 818 (1944); City
of Fort Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1939); dity of
Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248, 68 N.E.2d 278 (1946); Alexander Co.
v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 24 N.W.2d 244 (1946), noted in 31
MINN. L. REv. 292 (1946).
62. Reining v. N.Y., L. & W. Rr. Co., 128 N.Y. 157, 28 N.E. 640 (1891);
Rigney v. N.Y.C. & H. Rr. Co., 217 N.Y. 31, 111 N.E. 226 (1916). Note
also People v. Dmytro, 280 Mich. 82, 273 N.W. 40 (1937) sustaining a
prohibition on curb service.
63. Yale v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 134 Atl. 268 (1926);
Kelbro v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943).
64. Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177(1944); Kelbro v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943). Terry, The
Constit'utionality of Statutes forbidding Advertising Signs on Property,
24 YALE L.J. 1 (1914).
65. Mallory v. Griffey, 85 Pa. 275 (1877); Piollet v. Simmers, 106 Pa.
95 (1884).
66. McWhorter v. Dahl Chevrolet Co., 229 Mo. App. 1090, 88 S.W.2d 240(1936) ; Miller v. Town of Seaford, 22 Del. Ch. 159 (1937).
67. City of Birmingham v. Holt, 239 Ala. 248, 194 So. 538 (1940);
Woodward Avenue Corp. v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352, 20 N.W.2d 217 (1945);
Shields v. Chevrolet Truck Co., 195 S.C. 437, 12 S.E.2d 19 (1941).
68. Laura Vincent Co. v. City of Selma, 43 Cal. App.2d 473, 111 P.2d
17 (1941).
69. Miller v. Town of Seaford, 22 Del. Ch. 159, 194 Atl. 37 (1937).
70. People v. Caponigri, 169 Misc. 9, 6 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. Mag. Ct.
1938).
71. Compare City of Kalamazoo v. Crawford, 154 Mich. 58, 117 N.W.
572 (1908) or City of Owensboro v. Sweeney, 129 Ky. 607, 111 S.W. 364
(1908) with City of Lafayette v. Tanner, 149 La. 430, 89 So. 314 (1921)
or City of Roswell v. Bateman, 20 N.M. 77, 146 Pac. 950 (1915).
72. Compare City of Chicago v. O'Brien, 111 I1I. 532 (1884) or State
v. Jackman, 69 N.H. 318, 41 Atl. 347 (1898) with Village of Carthage v.
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Cities have been sustained in treating sidewalk newsstands
as nuisances.73 Reasonable municipal regulation of sidewalk
photographers is permissible, 74 although prohibitory fees are apt
to be voided. 5 A city can prohibit the "pull-in" of pedestrains
by zealous merchants.1 Control over sidewalk congestion has
been held to justify a prohibition on parking lot operators from
vending goods unless such business is conducted in a permanent
building.-7 Sidewalk vending ordinances are generally upheld,78
and it is only occasionally that a sidewalk trade regulation will
be ruled unreasonable and invalid.79 On the other hand, courts
will not permit cities to grant or lease sidewalks space for pri-
vate business if the adventure will materially interfere with
the public's pedestrian use."9
A municipality cannot ban at all times and places the distribu-
tion of religious, economic or political literature, nor can it
permit a public official to censor what will be distributed.- Rea-
sonable registration and identification ordinances, however, are
probably constitutional even as applied to such distributors . 3
Municipalities can prohibit violent picketing and even peaceful
picketing if it is carried on in a context of violence,8 4 or at a
location removed from the immediate area of the industrial
Frederick, 122 N.Y. 268, 25 N.E. 480 (1890) or Kansas City v. Holmes,
274 Mo. 159, 202 S.W. 392 (1918).
73. Cowin v. City of Waterloo, 237 Iowa 202, 21 N.W.2d 705 (1946).
74. Pittsford v. Los Angeles, 50 Cal. App.2d 25, 122 P.2d 535 (1942).
75. City of Racine v. Weyhe, 241 Wis. 133, 5 N.W.2d 747 (1942), noted
in 27 MARQ. L. REv. 105 (1943).
76. People v. Realmoto, 294 N.Y. 45, 60 N.E.2d 201 (1945). Compare
McKay Jewelers v. Bowron, 19 Cal.2d 595, 122 P.2d 543 (1942).
77. People v. Litvin, 312 Mich. 57, 19 N.W.2d 485 (1945).
78. Hindin v. Samuel, 158 Pa. Super. 539, 45 A.2d 370 (1946).
79. I re Thornburg, 55 Ohio App. 229, 9 N.E.2d 516 (1936); McKay
Jewelers v. Bowron, 19 Cal.2d 595, 122 P.2d 543 (1942).
80. Chapman v. City of Lincoln, 84 Neb. 534, 121 N.W. 596 (1909). See
Note, 25 L.R.A.(n.s.) 400 (1910).
81. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), noted in 46 COL. L. Rsv.
547 (1946); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946), noted in 34 GEo. L.J.
244 (1946) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), noted in 28
MINN. L. REv. 133 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943),
noted in 22 TEx. L. Rsv. 230 (1944); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
82. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938).
83. City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1941), cert.
dcnved 313 U.S. 562 (1941); Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543
(1947); Rescue Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
84. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287
(1941).
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dispute 5 And cities can at this writing even ban peaceful picket-
ing at the locus of the industrial dispute if the objective is for
a purpose unlawful or contrary to public policy.,,
According to Valentine v. Chrestense87 a municipality can
completely prohibit the distribution of commercial matter. A
number of state courts have upheld the Green River type of
ordinance declaring solicitation and peddling without invitation
a nuisance and punishing the same,88 although a sizable number
of state courts have ruled this type ordinance violative of state
constitutions8 9 The Commerce Clause will hold municipal regu-
lation of solicitors for out-of-state concerns to very narrow
limits.90 And state courts apply a reasonable test in passing
upon regulations of distributors and solicitors, upholding the
great majority so long as they are not discriminatory against
out-of-town merchants.9 1 Reasonable license fees are sustained.9 2
Street crossing ordinances are regularly upheld,9 3 so long as
they are not in conflict with state vehicle codes.9 4 Of interest is a
85. Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritters Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
86. Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Build-
ing Service Employees Intl. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) ; Hughes
v. California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
87. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), noted in 26 MINN. L. Rav. 895 (1942).
83. Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co. (10th Cir. 1933), 65 F.2d
112; Town of Green River v. Bungor, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936),
appeal dism., 300 U.S. 638, rehearing denied, 300 U.S. 688 (1937); San
Francisco Shopping News v. South San Francisco, 69 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.
1934); City of Alexandria v. Jones, 216 La. 923, 45 So.2d 79 (1950). See
Note, 88 A.L.R. 183 (1934).
89. Rhyne, Burton & Murphy, Municipal Regulation of Peddlers, Solici-
tors and Itinerant Merchants, (Nat. Inst. of Mun. Law Officers, Report No.
118, 1947); McIntyre and Rhyne, Municipal Legislative Barriers to a Free
Market, 8 LAw & CoNT='P. PROB. 359 (1941); Note, Municipal control of
peddlers, solicitors and distributors, 22 TULANE L. RaV. 284 (1947); Note,
Prohibitions of house-to-house convassing by municipalities. 31 KY. L.J. 291
(1943).
90. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Real Silk Hosiery Mills
v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925).
91. Ordinances prohibiting all itinerant peddlers on the streets are apt
to be deemed unreasonable as unrelated to public health and safety, and
invalid as a denial of due process. Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York,
290 N.Y. 312, 49 N.E.2d 153 (1943). Discrimination against non-residents
will frequently invalidate an ordinance. Goldstein v. City of Hamtramck,
227 Mich. 263, 198 N.W. 962 (1924); Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch
Commrs., 42 N.J.L. 364 (1880).
92. Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502 (1923); Jewel
Tea Co. v. City of Troy, 80 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1935).
93. Thorpe v. Bamberger R. Co., 107 Utah 265, 153 P.2d 541 (1944);
People v. Ausen, 105 P.2d 321, 40 Cal. App.2d Supp. 831 (1940).
94. Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
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judicially approved Portland, Oregon ordinance to the effect
that "between the hours of one and five a. m. it shall be unlawful
for any person to roam or be upon any street, alley or public
place without having and disclosing a lawful purpose."' 9 Gen-
erally speaking, municipal efforts to protect pedestrian safety
will be sustained.
FIRE PREVENTION
Municipalities may regulate extensively activities constituting
likely fire hazards, such as dry cleaners, 96 laundries, 97 lumber
yards,"6 coal yards,9  auto paint shops, 100 producers of gas'01 and
oil,' 2 oil storage depots, 1 3 and gas stations.0 4
Buildings constructed of certain materials may be excluded
from particular areas of the community. 05 One of the reasons
recognized by the judiciary in sustaining municipal billboard
regulation is the fire hazard occasioned by their collection of
papers and trash.0 6 The amount of combustible or inflammable
materials that may be assembled within a city may be limited.'
0 T
Buildings used by large numbers of the public, such as thea-
95. City of Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 403, 210 P.2d 577 (1949),
noted in 63 HARv. L. RaV. 1060 (1950).
96. Klever Shampay Karpet Kleaners v. City of Chicago, 323 Ill. 369,
154 N.E. 121 (1926); Mildner v. Cincinnati, 8 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 339 (1909).
97. In re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 9 Pac. 139 (1885); Ruban v. City of
Chicago, 330 Ill. 97, 161 N.E. 133 (1928); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S.
703 (1885); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). As elsewhere, arbi-
trary denial of licenses is unconsitutional. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886).
98. City of Chicago v. Churchill Cabinet Co., 379 Ill. 351, 40 N.E.2d
518 (1942).
99. Crerar Clinch Coal Co. v. City of Chicago, 341 Ill. 471, 173 N.E.
484 (1930).
100. City of Revere v. Blaustein, 320 Mass. 81, 67 N.E.2d 665 (1946).
101. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 139 Cal. 179, 72 Pac. 970 (1903).
102. Amis v. Bryan Petrol Corp., 185 Okla. 206, 90 P.2d 936 (1939).
103. Union Oil Co. v. City of Portland, 198 Fed. 441 (D. Ore. 1912).
104. Shuford v. Town of Waynesville, 214 N.C. 135, 198 S.E. 585 (1938).
105. Patterson v. Johnson, 214 Ill. 481, 73 N.E. 761 (1905); State v.
Johnson, 114 N.C. 846, 19 S.E. 599 (1894); City of Roanoke v. Bolling,
101 Va. 182, 43 S.E. 343 (1903) ; Micks v. Mason, 145 Mich. 212, 108 N.W.
707 (1906). See Notes, 26 A.L.R. 1219 (1923), 56 A.L.R. 878 (1928).
106. St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919);
Rochester v. West, 164 N.Y. 510, 58 N.E. 673 (1900); General Outdoor
Adv. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930).
107. Clark v. South Bend, 85 Ind. 276 (1882) ; Davenport v. Richmond,
81 Va. 636 (1886); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Danville, 199 Ill. 50, 64
N.E. 1110 (1902).
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ters, 10 8 factories,10 9 hotels"', and rooming houses"" are subject
to continual inspection and regulation, as are trailer camps and
trailers."
2
CONTROL OF ODORS, NOISES, SMOKE AND DIRT
Municipalities may keep out of the community, or parts
thereof, or at least regulate extensively, industries emitting noxi-
ous odors such as slaughterhouses, 1 ' sewage disposal plants,"'
piggeries, "' horse and mule markets, 6 livery stables," 7 gas
works," ,' and brick burning concerns." 9
Similarly, cities may exclude or regulate activities charac-
terized by undue noise, such as rock crushers,120 garages,'' dog
kennels,' 22 dance halls, 23 and establishments using juke boxes.24
108. Hollywood Theater Corp. v. City of Indianapolis, 218 Ind. 556, 34
N.E.2d 28 (1941).
109. People ex rel. Adamson v. Miller, 100 Misc. 302, 165 N. Y. Supp. 790
(Sup. Ct. 1917).
110. Daniels v. City of Portland, 124 Ore. 677, 265 Pac. 790 (1928).
111. City of Chicago v. Washingtonian Homes of Chicago, 289 Ill. 206,
124 N.E. 416 (1919) and cases cited therein; Queenside Hills Realty Co. v.
Saxe, 328 U.S. 80 (1946). See Notes, 6 A.L.R. 1584 (1920), 66 A.L.R. 1591(1930).
112. Loose v. City of Battle Creek, 309 Mich. 1, 14 N.W.2d 554 (1944);
Lower Merion Twp. v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35 (1946),
app. dism. 329 U.S. 669, noted in 45 MIcH. L. Rsv. 225 (1946). See Note,
115 A.L.R. 1400 (1938).
113. City of Albany v. Newhof 230 App. Div. 687, 246 N.Y. Supp. 100
(1930); Ex parte Heilbron, 65 Cal. 609, 4 Pac. 648 (1884); Beiling v.
City of Evansville, 144 Ind. 644, 42 N.E. 621 (1896). See Notes, 27 A.L.R.
329 (1923), 46 A.L.R. 1486 (1927).
114. Cf. Jeakins v. City of El Dorado, 143 Kan. 206, 53 P.2d 798 (1936).
115. Ryder v. Board of Health of City of Lexington, 273 Mass. 177, 173
N.E. 580 (1930).
116. Cf. Winbigler v. Clift, 102 Kan. 858, 172 Pac. 537 (1918).
117. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
118. Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. 179, 72 Pac. 970 (1903).
119. Fogarty v. Junction City Press Brick Co., 50 Kan. 478, 31 Pac.
1052 (1893). See Note, 141 A.L.R. 285 (1942).
120. Cf. Gilbert v. Davidson Construction Co., 110 Kan. 298, 203 Pac.
1113 (1922).
121. People v. Ericsson, 263 Ill. 368, 105 N.E. 315 (1915); People v.
Village of Oak Park, 266 Ill. 365, 107 N.E. 636 (1915); McIntosh v. John-
son, 211 N. Y. 265, 105 N.E. 414 (1914).
122. Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 (1897); City of
Dickinson v. Thress, 69 N.D. 748, 290 N.W. 653 (1940); Miller v. City of
Arcadia, 121 Cal. App. 660, 9 P.2d 587 (1932); City of Birmingham v.
West, 236 Ala. 434, 183 So. 421 (1938), cert. denied 306 U.S. 662 (1939).
Cf. Claesgens v. Animal Rescue League, 173 Minn. 61, 216 N.W. 535
(1927). Other animals may also be kept out of the municipality: Ryder v.
Board of Health of Lexington, 273 Mass. 177, 173 N.E. 580 (1930) (hogs);
Wiseman v. Close, 183 N.Y. Supp. 353 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (hogs); Brown v.
Klein, 133 N.J.L. 533, 45 A.2d 319 (1946) (hogs); In re Mathews, 191 Cal.
35, 214 Pac. 981 (1923) (goats); Ward v. Town of Darlington, 183 S.C. 263,
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Industries can be banned or extensively regulated when they
cause excessive smoke, soot and dust.125 And municipal anti-
smoke ordinances are regularly upheld.126 Because of the pos-
sibility of littering the public ways the distribution of commer-
cial matter can be banned. 127
It should be noted that in this area extraterritorial regulation
by municipalities is frequently authorized and upheld.128
MILK CONTROL
Municipal corporations generally have the power to regulate
conditions under which milk and dairy products129 are made
available to the community. Accordingly, cities can license, regu-
late and inspect producers'-" and distributors.' 3' They can in-
spect dairy products sold within the city, regardless of their
190 S.E. 826 (1937) (cows); Ex parte Valterz, 37 Cal. App.2d 682, 100
P.2d 337 (1940) (rabbits and poultry). So also pigeons, Kraushaar v.
Zion, 188 Misc. 851, 63 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1946), and bees, Ex partse Ellis, 11
Cal.2d 571, 81 P.2d 911 (1938). Generally, see Notes 32 A.L.R. 1372
(1924), 40 A.L.R. 566 (1926), 81 A.L.R. 1207 (1932).
123. Assman v. Masters, 151 Kan. 281, 98 P.2d 419 (1940).
124. Miller v. City of Memphis, 181 Tenn. 15, 178 S.W.2d 382 (1944);
Adams v. City of New Kensington, 357 Pa. 557, 55 A.2d 392 (1947).
125. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, (1915); Soon Hing v.
Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885). See Notes, 32 L.R.A.(n.s.) 554 (1911), 6
A.L.R. 1575 (1920).
126. Department of Health of City of New York v. Ebling Brewing Co.,
78 N.Y. Supp. 11 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1902); Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58,
164 S.W.2d 378 (1942); St. Paul v. Haugbro, 93 Minn; 59, 100 N.W. 470(1904). Municipalities can forbid the burning of certain coals, 58 A.L.R.
1229 (1929), and even forbid the introduction of these coals into the city.
Ballentine v. Nester, supra.
127. Sieroty v. City of Huntington Park, 111 Cal. App. 377, 295 Pac.
064 (1931); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); San Francisco
Shopping News -v% City of South San Francisco, 69 F.2d 879 (10th Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 606 (1934).
128. State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912); Chicago Packing
and Provision Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill. 221 (1878). See Note, 50
A.L.R. 1017 (1927).
129. The municipal power over milk customarily extends to such items
as ice cream, Wright v. Richmond County Department of Health, 182 Ga.
651, 186 S.E. 815 (1936); Simco Sales Service v. Brackin, 344 Pa. 628, 26
A.2d 323 (1942); and chocolate milk, Anderson v. City of Tampa, 121 Fla.
670, 164 So. 546 (1986).
130. Fischer v. City of St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361 (1904) ; Hill v. Fetherolf,
236 Pa. 70, 84 Atl. 677 (1912); Lang's Creamery v. City of Niagara Falls,
224 App. Div. 483, 231 N.Y.S. 368 (1928) ; Village of North College Hill v.
Woebkenberg, 59 Ohio App. 458, 18 N.E.2d 614 (1939).
131. City of Newport v. Hiland Dairy Co., 291 Ky. 561, 164 S.W.2d
818 (1947); Stracquadanio v. Department of Health of City of New York,
285 N.Y. 93, 32 N.E.2d 806 (1941), noted in 16 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 124(1941); Prescott v. City of Borger, 158 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1942); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Aurora, 404 Ill. 331, 88 N.E.2d 827 (1949); Kansas
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origin.1 32 Cities have frequently been sustained in inspecting,
outside the city limits, the herds1 3 and dairying facilities'3 4 of
concerns serving the urban market. Municipalities have also
been upheld in regulating the temperature at which milk is
transported into the city.135
Conflict with state law will invalidate municipal milk or-
dinances and, accordingly, cities cannot ordinarily ban the sale
of milk approved by state health authorities.,,- However, state
regulations of the milk industry does not preclude all municipal
complementation.1 37 The attempts of municipalities to erect
economic trade walls around the city and prevent the introduc-
tion of milk from outside will regularly be invalidated as beyond
municipal power,138 as an unconstitutional denial of equal pro-
City v. Henre, 96 Kan. 794, 153 Pac. 548 (1915). The ordinance cannot
vest an arbitrary discretion in the licenser. City of Rockford v. Hey, 366
Ill. 526, 9 N.E.2d 317 (1937). The license can be revoked upon proof of
unfitness, Prawdzik v. City of Grand Rapids, 313 Mich. 376, 21 N.W.2d
168 (1946), and customarily revocation can be effectuated summarily, with-
out notice or hearing. State ex rel. Nowotny v. City of Milwaukee, 140
Wis. 38, 121 N.W. 658 (1909); People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of
Health of City of New York, 189 N.Y. 187, 82 N.E. 187 (1907); Leach v.
Coleman, 188 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1945). A reasonable license fee may be
charged but the amount can not grossly exceed the cost of administering
the regulation, unless it is an exercise of a granted power to tax. Coleman
v. City of Little Rock, 191 Ark. 844, 88 S.W.2d 58 (1936); Pure Milk
Producers and Distributors Assn. v. Morton, 276 Ky. 736, 125 S.W.2d 216
(1939); Stephens v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 199, 1 P.2d 367 (1931).
132. Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 44 S.E. 717 (1903).
133. State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N.W. 1066 (1896); Norfolk v.
Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 44 S.E. 717 (1903); Carpenter v. Little Rock, 101 Ark.
238, 142 S.W. 162 (1911).
134. Stephens v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 199, 1 P.2d 367 (1931);
Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 Ill. 122, 104 N.E. 1104 (1915); Korth v. City
of Portland, 123 Ore. 180, 261 Pac. 895 (1927). However, municipalities
have no extraterritorial jurisdiction here unless expressly or impliedly
conferred. City of Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E.2d 317 (1937);
Higgins v. City of Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N.E.2d 520 (1948); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Waukegan, 403 Ill. 597, 87 N.E.2d 751 (1949), noted
in [1950] LAw FoRuI i 142. Note. 44 IL. L. REv. 241 (1949).
135. City of Chicago v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 275 Ill. 30, 113 N.E. 849
(1916).
136. Meridian v. Sippy, 54 Cal. App.2d 214, 128 P.2d 884 (1942) ; State
ex rel. Knese v. Kinsey, 314 Mo. 80, 282 S.W. 437 (1926); Shelton v. City
of Shelton, 111 Conn. 433, 150 Atl. 811 (1930) ; Prescott v. City of Borger,
158 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1942).
137. Dorssom v. City of Atchison, 155 Kan. 225, 124 P.2d 475 (1942);
Natural Milk Producers Assn. v. City of San Francisco, 20 Cal. App.2d
101, 124 P.2d 25 (1942); Witt v. Klimm, 97 Cal. App. 131, 274 Pac. 1039
(1929).
138. Higgins v. City of Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N.E.2d 520 (1948);
Dean Milk Co. v. Waukegan, 403 Ill. 597, 87 N.E.2d 751 (1949), noted in
[1950] LAw FoU um 142.
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tection,139 or as an unconstitutional direct burden on interstate
commerce. 14 The due process test of reasonableness must, of
course, be satisfied by all municipal milk ordinances.' 4'
FOOD AND BEVERAGE CONTROL
To safeguard the health of the community a municipal cor-
poration can license, 142 regulate and inspect slaughterhouses, 143
bakeries, 14 manufacturers and purveyors of candy,1'4 soft
drinks," ice,4 7 meat markets,148 groceries, 49 restaurants, 150
139. LaFranchi v. City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal.2d 331, 65 P.2d 1301
(1937) ; Prescott v. City of Borger, 158 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1942); Higgins
v. City of Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N.E.2d 520 (1948); Van Gammeren v.
Fresno, 51 Cal.App.2d 235, 124 P.2d 621 (1942); Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Aurora, 404 Il1. 331, 88 N.E.2d 827 (1949); State v. Minneapolis, 190
Minn. 138, 251 N.W. 121 (1933); Whitney v. Watson, 85 N.H. 238, 157
Atl. 78 (1931). Compare: Lang's Creamery v. City of Niagara Falls, 224
App. Div. 483, 231 N.Y. Supp. 368 (1928) ; Witt v. Klimm, 97 Cal.App. 131,
274 Pac. 1039 (1929).
140. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 71 S. Ct. 295 (1951); Miller v.
Williams, 12 F. Supp. 236 (D. Md. 1935).
141. Fieldcrest Dairies v. City of Chicago, 122 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1941),
noted in 30 ILL. B.J. 257 (1942) holding invalid an ordinance prohibiting
delivery of milk in anything but bottles. Courts also announce rather
frequently that the power to regulate is not the power to prohibit. Good
Humor Milk Corp. v. City of New York, 200 N.Y. 312, 49 N.E.2d 153
(1942).
142. The power to license generally flows from the power to regulate.
Fees must be reasonable. Cases collected in Note, 117 A.L.R. 1319 (1938).
Ordinances permitting arbitrary revocation will usually be void. State
ex rel. Makris v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 296, 193 Pac. 845 (1920).
143. Wichita Falls v. Roberson, 283 S.W. 870 (Tex. 1926); City of
Albany v. Newhof, 246 N.Y.S. 100, 230 App. Div. 687 (1930); Moore v.
Greensboro, 191 N.C. 592, 132 S.E. 565 (1926). See Notes, 27 A.L.R. 329
(1923), 46 A.L.R. 1486 (1927). Municipalities have been sustained in
inspecting out-of-town slaughterhouses providing meat for sale within the
city. City of Oakland v. Brock, 8 Cal.2d 639, 67 P.2d 344 (1937).
144. Ward Bakeries v. City of Chicago, 340 Ill. 212, 172 N.E. 171 (1930);
Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); City of Chicago
v. Drogasawicz, 256 Ill. 34, 99 N.E. 869 (1912). However, closing hour
ordinances allegedly necessary to facilitate inspection are frequently in-
validated. Skaggs v. City of Oakland, 6 Cal.2d 222, 57 P.2d 478 (1936);
McCulley v. City of Wichita, 151 Kan. 214, 98 P.2d 192 (1940).
145. Crackerjack Co. v. City of Chicago, 330 Ill. 320, 161 N.E. 479
(1928); People v. Greenberg, 134 App. Div. 599, 119 N.Y.S. 325 (1909);
State ex rel. Bacigalupo v. O'Conner, 115 Minn. 339, 132 N.W. 303 (1911).
146. City of Chicago v. Chicago Beverage Co., 372 Ill. 33, 22 N.E.2d
708 (1939); Miller v. City of Niagara Falls, 202 N.Y. Supp. 549 (Sup. Ct.
1924). Compare George v. City of Portland, 114 Ore. 418, 235 Pac. 681
(1925).
147. City of El Paso v. Jackson, 59 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
148. Ex parte Lowenthal, 92 Cal. App. 200, 267 Pac. 886 (1928); Trigg
v. Dixon, 96 Ark. 199, 131 S.W. 695 (1910); Kinsley v. City of Chicago,
124 II. 359, 16 N.E. 260 (1888); Ex parte Banta, 25 Cal. App.2d 622,
78 P.21 243 (1938); Cronin v. City of New York, 82 N.Y. 318 (1880).
Here, and throughout this area, ordinances passed under regulatory
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wholesalers and warehousers of foodstuffs,'-5 and vehicular dis-
tributors of the above. 5 2 Reasonable inspection fees will ordi-
narily be upheld. 5 3 However, ordinances passed under regula-
tory powers will be invalid if they require fees and contain
no provisions for regulation or inspection.'" Unless the license
fee is an exercise of an authorized municipal power of raising
revenue,
the authority of a municipality is limited to such a charge
for a license as will bear some reasonable relation to the
additional burdens imposed upon the municipality by the
business or occupation licensed and the necessary expense
involved in police supervision.1 5
Municipalities can provide by ordinance against the sale of
impure, unwholesome or adulterated foods, 56 and food unfit for
human consumption can be summarily seized and destroyed.1 7
Vendors of alcoholic beverages can be licensed 8 and regulated
by municipalities 59 unless the sale thereof has been forbidden
powers will fail if they contain requirements for fees without provision
for regulation or inspection. Herb Bros. v. City of Alton, 264 Ill. 628, 106
N.E. 434 (1914).
149. Ritter v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich. 416, 267 N.W. 641 (1936);
American Grocery Co. v. New Brunswick, 126 N.J.L. 367, 19 A.2d (Ct.
Err. & App. 1941).
150. City of Chicago v. R & X Restaurant, 369 Ill. 65, 15 N.E.2d 725
(1938); Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944).
See Note, 52 A.L.R. 669 (1928).
151. City of Chicago v. Arbuckle Bros., 344 Ill. 597, 176 N.E. 761 (1931);
Cranston v. Department of Health of City of New York, 6 N.Y.S.2d 275,
168 Misc. 749 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
152. Keig Stevens Baking Co. v. City of Savanna, 380 Ill. 303, 44
N.E.2d 23 (1942); American Baking Co. v. City of Wilmington, 370 Ill.
400, 19 N.E.2d 172 (1925); New Jersey Good Humor v. Board of Com-
missioners of Bradley Beach, 124 N.J.L. 162, 11 A.2d 113 (1940).
153. City of Dayton v. Jacobs, 120 Ohio St. 225, 165 N.E. 844 (1929).
154. Herb Bros. v. City of Alton, 264 Ill. 628, 106 N.E. 434 (1914).
155. Ward Baking Co. v. City of Chicago, 340 Ill. 212, 172 N.E. 171,
172 (1930). See Note, 117 A.L.R. 1319 (1938).
156. City of Chicago v. Union Ice Cream Mfg. Co., 252 Ill. 311, 96 N.E.
872 (1912).
157. North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908).
158. Ex parte Sikes, 102 Ala. 173, 15 So. 522 (1894). Note, 21 R. MT.
L. REv. 209 (1948).
159. State ex rel. Hewlett v. Womach, 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W.2d 809
(1946); Mutchall v. City of Kalamazoo, 323 Mich. 215, 35 N.W.2d 245
(1948); Nelson v. State ex rel. Gross, 157 Fla. 417, 26 So.2d 60 (1946);
Cowan v. City of St. Petersburg, 149 Fla. 470, 6 So.2d 269 (1942); City of
Hoboken v. Greiner, 68 N.J.L. 592, 53 Atl. 693 (1902); Foster v. Police
Commissioners, 102 Cal. 483, 37 Pac. 763 (1894). See Waukesha v. Stathas,
255 Wis. 76, 37 N.W.2d 846 (1949) for the dilemma of Wisconsin cities
in punishing any crime.
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by the state or there has been occupation of the field by state
authority.13 Here municipal corporations have frequently been
granted statutory authority to project their regulations beyond
city limits. 16
Occasionally food and beverage ordinances are invalidated be-
cause of discrimination against out-of-town merchants,162 and
unreasonable classifications. 1 33 Under the Commerce Clause fed-
eral occupation of the field will invalidate these, as well as other,
municipal ordinances.134
The keeping of food matter,1 5 its collection, transportation
and disposition"1 are subjects on which extensive municipal
regulation is possible. The collection of garbage by private con-
cerns may be forbidden.167 Reasonable charges for collection may
be levied by cities,60 or, if it chooses, a municipality may confer
a monopoly upon a single concern. 69
SANITATION AND HEALTH
To protect the public health and safety municipal authorities
can abate public nuisances, summarily if necessary.'70 The courts
160. Sparger v. Harris, 191 Okla. 583, 131 P.2d 1011 (1942).
161. People v. Raims, 20 Colo. 489, 39 Pac. 341 (1895).
162. Ex parte Irish, 122 Kan. 33, 250 Pac. 1056 (1926); Muhlenbrinck
v. Long Branch Comnmrs., 42 N.J.L. 364 (1880).
163. McCulley v. City of Wichita, 151 Kan. 214, 98 P.2d 192 (1940).
164. Quaker Oats Co. v. City of New York, 295 N.Y. 527, 68 N.E.2d
593 (1946).
165. City of Grand Rapids v. DeVries, 123 Mich. 570, 82 N.W. 269(1900); Grand Rapids Board of Health v. Vink, 184 Mich. 688, 151 N.W.
672 (1915). Cf. Donovan v. Town of New London, 132 Misc. 860, 231 N.Y.
Supp. 82 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
166. Geurin v. Little Rock, 203 Ark. 103, 155 S.W.2d 719 (1941);
Wheeler v. Boston, 233 Mass. 275, 123 N.E. 684 (1919) ; O'Neal v. Harrison,
99 Kan. 339, 150 Pac. 551 (1915) ; Gardner v. Dallas, 81 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 668 (1936).
167. City of Canton v. Van Voorhis, 61 Ohio App. 419, 22 N.E.2d 651(1939), app. dism. 135 Ohio St. 319, 20 N.E.2d 720 (1940), noted in 38
MICH. L. REv. 1334 (1940); Ex parte Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328, 81 Pac. 955(1905); Ex parte London, 73 Tex. Cr. 208, 163 S.W. 968 (1913).
168. People ex rel. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Glencoe, 372
Ill. 280, 23 N.E.2d 697 (1939); Glass v. City of Fresno, 17 Cal. App.2d
555, 62 P.2d 765 (1937).
169. Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905); State v. Lovelace, 118
Wash. 50, 203 Pac. 28 (1921); State v. Orr, 68 Conn. 101, 35 Atl. 770
(1896); City of Grand Rapids v. De Vries, 123 Mich. 570, 82 N.W. 269(1900). Generally, See Notes 27 L.R.A. 540 (1895), 21 L.R.A.(n.s.) 830(1909), 15 A.L.R. 287 (1921), 72 A.L.R. 520 (1931), 135 A.L.R. 1305
(1941).
170. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); City of St. Louis
v. Galt, 179 Mo. 8, 77 S.W. 876 (1903); City of Rochester v. Macauley-
Fien Milling Co., 199 N.Y. 207, 92 N.E. 641 (1910) ; New York Trap Rock
Corp. v. Town of Clarkston, 299 N.Y. 77, 85 N.E.2d 873 (1949).
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recognize some power to impose by ordinance the label of
nuisance upon things not considered common law nuisances,"'
but a municipality cannot by ordiance declare and suppress
something as a nuisance when it is not one in fact.172
Cities can protect their water supply from pollution.1 3 Plumb-
ers can be licensed,'- used plumbing fixtures can be inspected
before sale175 and the regulation of plumbing facilities is gen-
erally sustained. 7 6
Sanitary facilities in multiple dwellings, such as hotels and
tenement houses, 77 and in public buildings," s are subject to
inspection and regulation. So, too, are conditions in trailer
camps. 7 9 However, private dwellings can ordinarily be invaded
only where necessary to abate a public nuisance or where the
general health of the city will likely be endangered by the occu-
pant's failure to observe proper sanitary measures. 80
Municipalities can ban from the city activities and trades apt
171. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Sioux City v.
Simmons Hardware Co., 151 Iowa 334, 199 N.W. 978 (1911); City of Des
Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823, rehearing
denied, 193 Iowa 1256, 188 N.W. 921 (1921); Hislop v. Rodgers, 54 Ariz.
101, 92 P.2d 527 (1939); City of Miami Beach v. Texas Co., 141 Fla.
616, 194 So. 368 (1940). "It is a rule that a municipal corporation has
no power to treat a thing as a nuisance which cannot be one; but it
is equally settled that it has the power to treat as a nuisance a thing
that, from its character, location, and surroundings, may become such."
Nash v. District of Columbia, 28 App. Cas. (D.C.) 598, 601 (1907).
172. City of Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781, 155
S.W.2d 237 (1941) ; Potashnik v. City of Sikeston, 351 Mo. 505, 173 S.W.2d
96 (1943); Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810
(1923) ; City of Milwaukee v. Milbrew, 240 Wis. 527, 3 N.W.2d 386 (1942).
173. Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 145 Pac. 1047 (1915);
State v. Finney, 65 Idaho 630, 150 P.2d 130 (1944); City of New Rochelle
v. Burke, 288 N.Y. 406, 43 N.E.2d 463 (1942).
174. Arbitrary action here, as elsewhere, is invalid. Seignous v. Rice,
273 N.Y. 44, 6 N.E.2d 91 (1936).
175. Montgomery v. Oklahoma City, 195 Okla. 312, 157 P.2d 454 (1945).
176. Kleinhein v. Bentley, 98 Kan. 431, 157 Pac. 1190 (1916); Lavender
v. City of Tuscaloosa, 29 Ala. 502, 198 So. 459 (1940); Comm. v. Leswing,
135 Pa. Super. 485, 5 A.2d 809 (1939).
177. Tenement House Department v. Moeschen, 179 N.Y. 325, 72 N.E.
231 (1904) ; Keiper v. City of Louisville, 152 Ky. 691, 154 S.W. 18 (1913) ;
Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W. 914 (1910); Daniels v. City
of Portland, 124 Ore. 677, 265 Pac. 790 (1928).
178. People v. Dushkin, 276 Mich. 643, 268 N.W. 765 (1936).
179. Miller v. Quigg, 87 Fla. 462, 100 So. 270 (1924); Cody v. City of
Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939), app. dism. 309 U.S. 620.
Notes, 5 DETROIT L. REv. 200 (1941), 45 MicH. L. REv. 225 (1946).
180. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), noted in 17 U.
CHI. L. Rov. 735 (1950).
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to imperil the public health,"" and other occupations, such as
barbering, which may spread disease are subject to inspection
and considerable regulation.1 2 Municipal corporations are fre-
quently clothed with authority to extraterritorially enforce their
sanitary and health ordinances.'8 3
PUBLIC MORALITY
There is authority to sustain municipal punishment of gamb-
ling, even though the state has penalized the same activity,18
although such authority has also been denied. 8 5 Fortune telling
may accordingly be forbidden by municipalities. 8 r If forms of
gambling are not made criminal by state law, cities may license
and regulate such things as dog races, 8 7 pinball and marble
machines,"8 and other forms of chance. 8 9 Of course, if the
form of gambling has been outlawed by state action municipal
licensing will fail. 90
Extensive regulation of pool and billiard rooms is regularly
upheld,'' and frequently complete bans are sustained. 92 Dance
181. Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358(1910); City of Little Rock v. Smith, 204 Ark. 692, 163 S.W.2d 705
(1942).
182. Grisbord v. City of Philadelphia, 148 Pa. Super. 91, 24 A.2d 646
(1942). Occupation of the field by the state is possible. Trimble v. City of
Topeka, 147 Kan. 111, 75 P.2d 241 (1938).
183. White v. City of Decatur, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873 (1932); State
v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912). Cf. St. Bernard Poultry Farm
v. City of Aurora, 98 Colo. 158, 54 P.2d 684 (1936).
184. Hunter v. Mayor and Council of Teaneck, 128 N.J.L. 164, 24 A.2d
553 (1942).
185. In re Portnoy, 21 Cal.2d 237, 131 P.2d 1 (1942).
186. Turner v. Kansas City, 354 Mo. 835, 191 S.W.2d 612 (1945)- Taylor
v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, certiorari to the Supreme Court of
California denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
187. Town of Hallandale v. Brownard County Kennel Club, 153 Fla.
302, 14 So.2d 397 (1943).
188. Ex parte Lawrence, 55 Cal. App.2d 491, 131 P.2d 27 (1942);
Savoy Vending Co. v. Valentine, 178 Misc. 1, 33 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct.
1942); Silfen v. City of Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 117, 19 N.E.2d 640 (1939);
Sternall v. Strand, 76 Cal. App.2d 432, 172 P.2d 921 (1946); Hunter v.
Mayor and Council of Teaneck Twp., 128 N.J.L. 164, 24 A.2d 553 (1942).
189. People v. Hess, 85 Mich. 128, 48 N.W. 181 (1891). See Note, 39
A.L.R. 1035 (1925).
190. State ex Tel. Sergi v. City of Youngstown, 68 Ohio App. 254, 40
N.E.2d 477 (1941).
191. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912); Clarke v. Deckebach,
274 U.S. 392 (1927); Johnson v. City of Lawrence, 120 Kan. 65, 241 Pac.
1083 (1926). Occasional ordinances are deemed unreasonable and in-
validated. Craig v. Mayor and Aldermen of Gallatin, 168 Tenn. 413,
79 S.W.2d 553 (1935) (ordering closing from 6 p.m. to 7 a.m.).
192. State ex rel. Baylor v. City of Hinton, 109 W. Va. 653, 155 S.E.
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halls are similarly subject to inspection and regulation. 1 3 Muni-
cipalities may adopt rules prohibiting vulgar, obscene and in-
decent exhibitions.19 4 Disorderly houses can, of course, be
banned. 95 Plays 98 and motion pictures'0 7 may be censored, and
theater licenses can be revoked for performances shocking to the
morality of the community.198 The utterance of language charac-
terized as blasphemous, profane, and obscene can be punished."9 9
In the absence of conflict with state law ordinances forbidding
Sunday business have been sustained.
2
00
THE PUBLIC PURSE
Municipalities have rather extensive powers to protect the
community against fraud and deception. Cities are sustained
in licensing and regulating pawn brokers,2 01 second - hand
912 (1930). Generally, See Notes, 20 A.L.R. 1482 (1922), 29 A.L.R. 41(1924), 53 A.L.R. 149 (1928), 72 A.L.R. 1339 (1931).
193. Bungalow Amusement Co. v. City of Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269
Pac. 1043 (1928). See also Mallach v. City of Mt. Morris, 287 Mich. 666,
284 N.W. 600 (1939). Prohibitions are frequently sustained. Francis
v. Town of Falkville, 24 Ala. App. 478, 136 So. 866 (1931), but see Town
of Jonesville v. Boyd, 161 La. 278, 108 So. 481 (1926).
194. People v. O'Gorman, 274 N.Y. 284, 8 N.E.2d 862 (1937) ; Brooks v.
City of Birmingham, 32 F.2d 274 (N.D. Ala. 1929); City of Grand Rapids
v. Bateman, 93 Mich. 135, 53 N.W. 6 (1892); Bonserk Theater Corp. v.
Moss, 34 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
195. City of Chicago v. Clark, 359 Ill. 374, 194 N.E. 537 (1935); People
v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N.W. 1124 (1889). People v. Pennock,
294 Mich. 578, 293 N.W. 759 (1940) sustains another municipal protection
of public morals.
196. City of Chicago v. Kirkland, 79 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1936).
197. Thayer Amusement Co. v. Moulton, 63 R.I. 182, 7 A.2d 682 (1939).
Cf. Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N.W. 152 (1936). Comment, 49
YALE L.J. 87 (1939). Note, 39 COL. L. REv. 1383 (1939). See Note, 126
A.L.R. 1363 (1940).
198. Bonserk Theater Corp. v. Moss, 34 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
Cf. Holly Holding Co. v. Moss, 270 N.Y. 621, 1 N.E.2d 359 (1936) to the
effect that the city could not revoke a theater license for violating statute
relating to immoral stage entertainments in absence of a conviction for
violating the statute relating to immoral plays and exhibitions. The
revocation is, of course, subject to judicial review and cannot be effected
arbitrarily by municipal authorities. Fox Amusement Co. v. McClellan,
62 Misc. 100, 114 N.Y. Supp. 594 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
199. Oney v. Oklahoma City, 120 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1941); Cf. Lamere
v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 552, 63 N.E.2d 863 (1945).
200. City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447 17 N.E.2d 52 (1938); City
of Harlan v. Scott, 290 Ky. 585, 162 S.W.2d 8 (1943); People v. DeRose,
230 Mich. 180, 203 N.W. 95 (1925). See Notes, 29 A.L.R. 397 (1924), 37
A.L.R. 575 (1925).
201. Medias v. City of Indianapolis, 216 Ind. 155, 23 N.E.2d 590 (1939);
Solof v. City of Chattanooga, 180 Tenn. 296, 174 S.W.2d 471 (1943);
City of Wichita v. Wolkow, 110 Kan. 114, 202 Pac. 632 (1921); Provident
Loan Co. v. Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 Pac. 10 (1918); See Note, 125 A.L.R.
598 (1940).
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stores,202 second-hand car dealers, 0 3 auctioneers, 204 ticket
brokers,2115 and automatic vending machines.206 Municipalities
have been upheld in prescribing the weight and quality of such
things as bread2 0 7 and coal,208 as well as the capacity of milk
containers. -9 Unless over-ridden by state law, cities have been
able to regulate charges of small loan companies2lo and money
changers.211 Municipal attempts to fix prices for commodities
and services have generally been condemned as beyond civic
power,2 1- although courts have been receptive to municipal or-
dinances making illegel the sale of rationed articles above ceiling
prices 2M Except in a few home rule states214 the legislative
power to fix rates for utilities is denied to municipalities, 21' al-
202. City of Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670, 64 N.W. 29 (1895);
She rman, Clay & Co. v. Brown, 142 Wash. 37, 252 Pac. 131 (1927).
203. Chalet v. East Orange, 136 N.J.L. 375, 56 A.2d 599 (1948).
204. Saigh v. Common Council of City of Petosky, 251 Mich. 77, 231
N.W. 107 (1930); Holsman v. Thomas, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750
(1924); bvt see Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 141 Neb. 363, 3 N.W.2d
635 (1942) invalidating an ordinance requiring auctioneers to file an in-
ventory fifteen days before sale. Generally, see Notes 31 A.L.R. 299 (1924),
39 A.L.R. 773 (1925), 46 A.L.R. 157 (1927), 52 A.L.R. 491 (1928).
205. Kelly-Sullivan v. Moss, 22 N.Y.S.2d 491, 174 Misc. 1098, affd. 24
N.Y.S.2d 984, 260 App. Div. 921 (1940).
206. Larson v. City of Rockford, 371 Ill. 441, 21 N.E.2d 396 (1931). The
possibility of cigarettes getting into the hands of minors justifies extensive
regulation of cigarette vending machines. Illinois Cigarette Service Co.
v. City of Chicago, 89 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1937), State v. Crabtree Co., 218
Minn. 36, 15 N.W.2d 98 (1944).
207. People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594 49 N.W. 609 (1891); City of
Chicago v. Schmidinger, 243 Ill. 167, 90 N.E. 369 (1909).
208. City of St. Louis v. Triangle Fuel Supply Co., 193 S.W.2d 914
(Mo. App. 1946); Phillipsburg Supply Co. v. Morrison, 27 North. 271 (Pa.
Corn. Pl. 1940). Note City of Chicago v. Cuda, 403 Ill. 381, 86 N.E.2d 192
(1949) denying extraterritorial effect to municipal coal regulatory or-
dinance.
209. City of Chicago v. Bowman Dairy, 234 Ill. 294, 84 N.E. 913 (1908).
210. Ray v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886(1942).
211. Arnold v. City of Chicago, 387 Ill. 532, 56 N.E.2d 795 (1944).
212. City of Mobile v. Rouse, 27 Ala. App. 344, 173 So. 254 (1937);
Ex parte Herrick, 25 Cal. App.2d 751, 77 P.2d 262 (1938). Contra:
Anthony v. City of Atlanta, 66 Ga. App. 504, 18 S.E.2d 81 (1942).
213. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945) ; City of Cleve-
land v. Piskora, 145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.E.2d 919 (1944); People v. Lewis,
295 N.Y. 42, 64 N.E.2d 702 (1946).
214. City of New York v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 257 N.Y. 20,
177 N.E. 295 (1930); Eldridge v. Ft. Worth Transit Co., 136 S.W.2d 955
(Tex. 1940).
215. City of Detroit v. Public Utilities Comm., 288 Mich. 367, 286 N.W.
368 (1939); City of Louisville v. Louisville Ry. Co., (8th Cir. 1930), 39
F.2d 822; Lynchburg Traction and Light Co. v. City of Lynchburg, 16
F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1927).
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though generally courts admit municipal power to set rates by
contract or franchise. Municipal power to control deceptive ad-
vertising is generally recognized.2 10
TRADE REGULATION GENERALLY
It should always be borne in mind that municipalities having
strictly limited powers must find express or necessarily implied
power to regulate any aspect of trade or business.217
Although courts frequently announce that "... if a business
sought to be regulated does not tend to injure the public health,
public morals or interfere with the general welfare it is not a
subject for the exercise of the police power,'218 it is unive)rsally
recognized that if a business, e.g. a junkyard, is apt to become
a nuisance it can be regulated extensively,2 9 and even be ex-
cluded from parts of the community.
220
In general the power to regulate a trade embraces the power
to require a license.221 Accordingly, municipalities have regularly
been sustained in licensing many forms of trade, business and
professions such as merchants,222 manufactories, 223 utilities,224
lawyers,2 2 5 amusement parks, 2 6 and boarding houses.227 And
216. City of Springfield v. Hurst, 144 Ohio St. 49, 57 N.E.2d 425 (1944);
City of St. Louis v. Southcombe, 320 Mo. 865, 8 S.W.2d 1001 (1928);
Cf. Ritholz v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 258, 13 N.W.2d 283 (1944).
217. Condon v. Village of Forest Park, ?78 Ill. 218, 115 N.E. 825
(1917): power to regulate and license amusement places held not to
authorize license of golf course; Bullnan v. City of Chicago, 367 Ill. 217, 10
N.E.2d 961, 1937): power to license junk dealers does not authorize
licensing of car dealers who accepted in trade and stored used tires.
218. City of Chicago v. R & X Restaurant, 369 Ill. 65, 15 N.E.2d 725
(1938). See also Jewell Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 137 Neb. 768, 291 N.W.
664 (1940).
219. Lerner v. City of Delavan, 203 Wis. 32, 233 N.W. 608 (1930);
Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 27 Cal.2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945), app. dism.
331 U.S. 543 (1947). See Note, 30 A.L.R. 1427 (1924).
220. Town of Grundy Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677(1942); Knack v. Velick Scrap Iron Co., 219 Mich. 573, 189 N.W. 54
(1922). Compare Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsburg, 114
Vt. 341, 34 A.2d 188 (1943).
221. Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340, 52 N.E. 44 (1898).
222. Van Hook v. City of Selma, 70 Ala. 361 (1881).
223. La Crosse Rendering Works v. City of La Crosse, 231 Wis. 438,
285 N.W. 393 (1939). Cf. Barnard & Miller v. City of Chicago, 316 Ill.
519, 147 N. E. 384 (1925). See note, 124 A.L.R. 523 (1939).
224. Seaboard Airline RR. v. City of Raleigh, 242 U.S. 15 (1916).
225. Davis v. Ogden City, 215 P.2d 616 (Utah 1950).
226. Eastwood Amusement Park v. Stark, 325 Mich. 60, 38 N.W.2d
77 (1949). So also bowling alleys. See Note, 20 A.L.R. 1482 (1922).
227. Edwards v. Los Angeles, 48 Cal. App.2d 62, 119 P.2d 370 (1941).
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even graduated license fees on chains are generally upheld. 28
License fees must be reasonable, however, and cannot grossly
exceed the cost of policing the trade or activity,229 unless the
fee is authorized as an expression of municipal tax power.
230
Courts customarily rebel at municipal attempts to prohibit law-
ful trades through the licensing technique.2 31 Licensing or-
dinances will be invalidated when the standard of revocation
is so vague as to permit an official to cancel "for good and satis-
factory reasons. ' 232 There is always the possibility that munici-
pal licensing of trades and occupations will fail because of con-
flict with state law.2 33
The ability of municipalities to set closing hours for businesses
and trades has been sustained in some cases, 2 4 but denied in the
majority of decisions.2 35 All municipal regulatory ordinances
must be reasonable to survive.2 3  And there is a discernible
judicial inclination to invalidate trade regulations if they appear
to have been passed primarily to benefit a group of business
concerns at the expense of competitors.2 37
228. Safeway Stores v. City of Portland, 149 Ore. 581, 42 P.2d 162
(1935). Notes, Fulton, Anti-chain store legislation, 30 MICH. L. REV. 274
(1931), 33 MICH. L. Rnv. 970 (1934), See Notes, 73 A.L.R. 1481 (1932),
85 A.L.R. 736 (1934), 112 A.L.R. 305 (1938).
229. Matheny v. City of Hutchinson, 154 Kan. 681, 121 P.2d 227 (1942);
Hill v. City of Eureka, 35 Cal. App.2d 154, 94 P.2d 1025 (1939). Courts
are inclined to uphold larger fees when the activity is one "illegal in
tendency." Notes, Limitations on the Power to License, 27 MARQ. L. Rv.
105 (1943). See Notes, 14 L.R.A.(n.s.) 788 (1908), 20 A.L.R. 1482 (1922),
29 A.L.R. (1924), 53 A.L.R. 149 (1927), 72 A.L.R. 1339 (1931).
230. McKay v. City of Wichita, 135 Kan. 678, 11 P.2d 733 (1932).
231. Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 200 N.Y. 312, 49 N.E.2d
153 (1942) ; New Jersey Good Humor Inc. v. Board of Commrs. of Borough
of Bradley Beach, 124 N.J.L. 162, 11 A.2d 113 (1940).
232. Eastwood Amusement Park v. Stark, 325 Mich. 60, 38 N.W.2d 77
(1949).
233. Trimble v. City of Topeka, 147 Kan. 111, 75 P.2d 241 (1938);
Jackson v. City of Sylacauga, 25 Ala. 244, 144 So. 125 (1932).
234. Solof v. City of Chattanooga, 180 Tenn. 296, 174 S.W.2d 471 (1943)
(pawnshop); Justesen's Food Stores v. City of Tulare, 12 Cal.2d 324,
84 P.2d 140 (1937) (grocery).
235. Chaives v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755, 139 S.E. 559 (1927)
(barber shop); Cowan v. City of Buffalo, 247 App. Div. 591, 288 N.Y. Supp.
239 (1945) (market); Olds v. Klotz, 131 Ohio St. 447, 3 N.E.2d 371
(1936) (grocery); Deese v. City of Lodi, 21 Cal. App.2d 631, 69 P.2d 1005
(1937) (grocery) ; City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49
N.E.2d 412 (1943) (barber shop); Crawford's Clothes v. City of Newark,
131 N.J.L. 97, 35 A.2d 38 (1944) (clothing store); McCulley v. City of
Wichita, 151 Kan. 214, 98 P.2d 192 (1940) (grocery).
236. People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (1889); City of
Chicago v. Gunning, 214 Ill. 628, 73, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905).
237. S.S. Kresge, Co. v. Couzens, 290 Mich. 185, 287 N.W. 427
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Notwithstanding some thought that municipalities cannot
punish for crimes,23 18 and some further opinion that municipal
punishment is invalid when the same act is penalized by state
statute,239 municipal corporations should be permitted to punish
as crimes violations of trade regulatory ordinances contrary to
the safety and good order of the local community.20
CONCLUSION
Home rule cities, as well as those municipalities depending
upon legislative grants of power, usually have adequate legisla-
tive authority to protect the public health, safety, morality and
general welfare. Generally speaking, municipal ordinances will
be valid if they are reasonable and have a reasonable relationship
to one of the aforementioned legitimate ends. The commerce,
equal protection, and due process clauses of the United States
Constitution are ever-present limitations upon the exercise of
admitted municipal powers. Furthermore, municipal corpora-
tions in protecting the community health, safety, morality and
general welfare must ever be on guard against conflict with
state law or state occupation of the field. As in the past the
satisfactory accomplishment of the municipal law job will de-
pend upon the awareness and ingenuity of municipal legisla-
tures, plus increasing understanding and sympathy to novel
municipal solutions by state high courts often staffed with jurists
from non-urban areas.
(1939) ; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Chicago, 385 Ill. 565 53 N.E.2d 612(1944). See also Ricca v. Board of Commrs. of Town of Belleville, 1 N.J.
Super. 139, 62 A.2d 746 (App.Div. 1948).
238. State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 28 N.W.2d 345(1947); City of Waukesha v. Stathas, 255 Wis. 76, 37 N.W.2d 846 (1949).
239. Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405 (1892); People v. Hanrahan, 75
Mich. 611, 42 N.W. 1124 (1889). See Note, 147 A.L.R. 566 (1943).
240. Note, 96 U. of PA. L. REV. 582 (1948).
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